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The debt of Third World nations exceeds $1.3 trillion. 
This paper analyses the factors which combined to bring 
about this situation and reveals the devastating effects 
that the debt crisis and 'stabilisation' policies are having 
on the Third World's poor and on the world's 
environment. The author suggests some imaginative 
solutions, which address the debt crisis in ways designed 
to contribute both to democratisation and environmental 
rehabilitation. 
The author, Susan George, has written widely on food politics. Her books include: How the 
Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for World Hunger, Penguin, 1976; Feeding the Few: 
Corporate Control of Food, Institute for Policy Studies, 1979; Ill Fares the Land: Essays 
on Food, Hunger and Power, Institute for Policy Studies, 1985; and A Fate Worse Than 
Debt, Penguin, 1988 (revised edition imminent). 
Dr George is a Fellow and Associate Director of the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam; 
she works with non-government organisations and the media to popularise the struggle 
against world hunger and the consequences of debt; and she has served on the boards of 
national and multilateral organisations concerned with development. In January 1989, she 
joined the International Advisory Board of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa. 
The views expressed are hers. 
Introduction 
Fallen bodies, pillaged shops, massive police retaliation: the scenes of violence in Venezuela 
are still fresh in our memories. The hundreds who died were overwhelmingly poor 
Venezuelans protesting sudden and unendurable increases in their cost of living. They fell 
victim to a continuing crisis which had already claimed over three thousand lives in riots in 
23 countries as different as Brazil, Jamaica, Egypt and Zambia. The same crisis, according 
to UNICEF, is responsible for the deaths of 500,000 children every year. It is the Third 
World debt crisis. 
In 1986, the debt owed by Third World nations first passed the trillion dollar mark, and as 
of 1989 stood at $1.3 million million. This unprecedented financial burden has not only 
disastrous economic consequences but profound implications for relations between rich and 
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poor countries, for citizens of both the North and the South and for the prospects of a peaceful 
world. To understand these implications we must try to answer three basic questions: 
• How were such huge debts accumulated? 
• How is this debt being administered and which social groups bear the burden of 
reimbursement? 
• What solutions could bring an equitable end to the crisis? 
How was the debt accumulated? 
It takes two - borrowers arfd lenders - to build a debt mountain, and until the bubble burst 
in 1982, both behaved irresponsibly. They share blame for the current crisis. National debt 
is a normal phenomenon: when borrowed money is invested productively it helps a country 
develop and reimbursement does not cause serious problems. Most of the money borrowed 
during the 1970s was not, however, invested productively. Instead, it was devoted to: 
Paying for petroleum. Many conventional explanations of the debt crisis place all the 
blame on the price increases imposed by the oil producing countries. OPEC countries raised 
prices twice, in 1973 and in 1979, and their incomes escalated accordingly. They could not 
absorb the sudden surge in revenues and deposited the money in Western banks which, in 
tum, had to find an outlet in order to pay interest to their depositors. OPEC deposits were 
thus 'recycled' in Third World countries, with bankers aggressively placing loans. Although 
this explanation is true as far as it goes, higher oil prices account for less than a third of the 
present debt burden. 
Weapons purchases. Armaments are pure consumption, never productive and, unlike 
investment in agriculture or industry, do not generate wealth. Borrowing to strengthen armed 
forces and for purchases of military hardware accounts for about 20 percent of Third World 
debt. 
Capital flight. Wealthy individuals, government officials and companies frequently sent 
borrowed money straight back to the banks as deposits. Although it is impossible to measure 
precisely, Mexican capital flight alone is reliably estimated to be equivalent to Mexico's 
entire debt- over $100 billion. And although Africa is the poorest of all continents, rich 
Africans exported at least $22 billion in flight capital between 1979 and 1986. The borrowing 
country no longer has part of the money, yet must still pay interest on the full face value of 
the loan. The banks are paid back twice - once in flight capital deposits, again in interest on 
the debt as shown on their books. 
'Pharaonic' projects, as Latin Americans call them. These unproductive investments, 20th 
century 'pyramids', are huge, environmentally destructive dams, underused 'turnkey' 
factories, stadia, nuclear power plants, etc. Brazil spent about forty billion borrowed dollars 
on nonfunctioning nuclear plants; while the Philippines must pay interest of $500,000 per 
day on money loaned for a nuclear reactor which will soon be dismantled. (It was built in a 
volcanic zone ... ) 
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Current consumption. Some countries, particularly in Latin America, borrowed money to 
import foreign goods consumed by the upper and middle classes, basically living beyond 
their means. These massive imports not only added to the debt mountain, but undermined 
local enterprise unable to compete with imported goods sold at artificially low prices. In 
countries like Chile, national firms and factories failed by the hundreds, leaving a legacy of 
massive unemployment 
Interest payments. Interest is simply the cost of using someone else's money. Third World 
countries borrowed most of their money at variable rather than fixed interest rates, thus 
placing themselves at the mercy of market fluctuations. In the 1970s, interest rates were low 
or even negative (lower than the rate of inflation). In the 1980s, however, inflation fell 
dramatically and real interest rates rose, so borrowers were suddenly obliged to pay far more 
on their loans. These rates have continued to rise throughout the 1980s. 
Even when borrowed money was not spirited northwards in flight capital, spent on military 
hardware, current consumption, unproductive projects or absorbed by higher oil prices or 
interest rates, still loans were all too often invested in production for export. Both public 
and private creditors encouraged debtor countries to participate fully in world markets, even 
if this meant denying the basic needs of their people. Exports were supposed to raise the 
standard of living for everyone in the long run - and were also vital to earn the hard currency 
needed to pay back the loans. Meanwhile, in the poor countries, agriculture and industries 
geared to satisfying internal demand foundered for want of investment and unemployment 
became chronic. 
As the debt crisis clearly shows, these factors add up to a costly and unsustainable 
development model. When 'development' is based on excessive military and police estab-
lishments, prestige projects, outward-looking economies and the enrichment of a small elite 
to the detriment of everyone else - the logical consequences are continuing hunger, disease 
and poverty for the majority. 
How is the debt being administered and which social 
groups are making sacrifices to reimburse it? 
When a country is living beyond its means and cannot cover imports or interest payments 
from reserves or from new commercial loans, it must bridge the gap by borrowing from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Fund was set up to make loans to countries with 
balance of payments deficits (which occur when imports exceed exports). The IMF never 
gives credit, however, without conditions -and the worse the finances of the country, the 
tougher the conditions. Governments have no choice but to accept IMF 'adjustment' or 
'stabilisation' programs (often called 'austerity' programs) and to comply with its advice. 
Without the IMF seal of approval, the country will get no further loans from any public or 
private financial source in the world. 
The IMF's adjustment plans seek to force the debtor to earn more than it spends or, in Fund 
language, to restore a positive balance of payments. Deficits can only be wiped by exporting 
more and spending less. Such advice would be wise if only a few countries were receiving 
it. Unfortunately, dozens of countries are now under IMF tutelage and all of them at once 
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are trying to earn hard cash by exporting goods which fall into a narrow range - agricultural 
and mineral raw materials or, in slightly more sophisticated economies, textiles, apparel, 
microprocessors, etc. 
Too many goods competing on saturated world markets lead to gluts and rapidly falling 
prices. In 1987, Third World raw material export prices hit their lowest levels in sixty years. 
To make matters worse, Northern countries try to protect their ailing industries through 
tariffs and other barriers. If the rich creditor countries want interest paid on their loans, they 
must open their markets and import from the debtors. Logically, they cannot expect payback 
of loans while refusing to purchase the debtors' goods - and yet they do! 
The IMF also obliges countries undergoing structural adjustment to slash public spending. 
Budgets for health, education and welfare are invariably the first to suffer. Prices for essential 
services like electricity, water and public transport increase dramatically. Food subsidies are 
always an early target- with the result that prices for staple foods on which the poor most 
depend- bread, rice, tortillas or cooking oil - may double overnight. The IMF claims that it 
does not itself choose the budgets that must be cut- it leaves that up to governments. Still, 
not a single IMF program has demanded cuts in military or police expenditures, possibly 
because 'IMF riots' like those in Venezuela over escalating prices are frequent occurences. 
Just at the time when the cost of life's basic necessities inexorably rises, caps are placed on 
wages and credit becomes much more expensive, so local firms contract or fail. Governments 
sack thousands of their own employees - civil servants, teachers, health workers, etc. and 
close down or sell-off public enterprises. The IMF calls this 'reducing demand', and it is 
commonplace to find cuts in real wages of 30 to 70 percent. These sacrifices are imposed 
on people already living close to the brink of survival. 
Sharp devaluation of the local currency is another standard feature of IMF programs. True, 
many Third World currencies are grossly overvalued, but drastic devaluation means that 
people's savings in their own countries' currencies are wiped out. Their purchasing power 
is thus further reduced. Imported goods automatically cost more after devaluation. For oil 
importing countries, any item requiring transportation- virtually everything- will naturally 
cost more. Most poor countries do not produce their own medicines, fertilisers, spare parts 
for vehicles, etc. which they must also import at far higher prices - or do without. For want 
of such basic items, whole industries decline, buses stop running, patients cannot be 
transported to hospital - where they would find little medicine and equipment in any case. 
These measures are presented as technical, yet clearly none of them is neutral. People who 
derived no benefit from debt-financed projects are expected to make sacrifices so that debts 
can be paid. Malnutrition, illness and death rates increase among the poor. To give just one 
example, a worker who received the minimum wage in Peru in 1980 (who was therefore 
already a member of a privileged 'aristocracy' of labour) had to work seventeen minutes to 
earn a kilo of rice or a tin of powdered milk. Five years later, the same worker with a 
minimum wage (even more a privileged person five years later) had to work 2 hours, 5 
minutes to earn a kilo of rice and 1 hour, 15 minutes to earn a tin of powdered milk. In other 
words, seven times more to earn the rice, nearly five times more to earn the milk. 
The middle class slides into poverty. Elites, however, are little affected when public 
transport, schools and hospitals deteriorate or are closed, because they can afford private 
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ones. Upper classes continue to eat well and to educate their children while the number of 
hungry children, low birthweight babies and school dropouts grows. 
Emphasis on export production also has harmful consequences for ordinary people. Food 
crops for local consumption tend to be supplanted by saleable cash-crops, although these 
fetch very low prices. When less food is produced internally, it too becomes more expensive. 
Peasants are encouraged to produce more coffee or cotton; they have less time and space 
for com and beans. The environment suffers and natural resources are squandered in the 
desperate effort to cash-in anything saleable. Heavily indebted countries like Brazil, In-
donesia and the Philippines will, at present rates, have almost no tropical forests left in the 
year 2000. 
The debt crisis is not merely a problem for the Third World: its effects are also deeply felt 
in the rich industrialised countries of the North. The South used to be a good customer for 
Europe, purchasing about a third of European exports. Now debtors must serve the banks 
first - and banks have indeed made record profits. But no funds are left for other purchases, 
so people in the North lose their jobs in industries that once manufactured goods for export 
Farms fail massively, particularly in the United States, where one acre in three was devoted 
to crops sold abroad. 
The debt drain means that the poor are financing the rich on an unprecedented scale. Between 
1982 and 1987, the Third World remitted to the rich countries $287 billion more than it 
received in new loans or aid. This figure does not count capital flight or low commodity 
prices. 
What solutions could bring an equitable end to the 
crisis? 
Over a hundred technicaVfinancial solutions have been proposed, but most would simply 
tend to pile new debt on old. Several countries considered important to Northern interests 
have had their debts 'rescheduled'- or pushed into the future- at slightly more favourable 
rates; they remain in debt bondage nonetheless. 
Repudiation. Many people wonder why Third World countries don't simply stop paying 
and let the North worry about the problem (as Fidel Castro has proposed). Northern banks 
would no longer be threatened if this happened- today the banks have reduced their exposure 
to the extent that only 6 percent of their loan portfolios are placed in the Third World. 
Although economic chaos and riots may one day push indebted governments to default, as 
of mid-May 1989, while some debtor governments had tried to limit payments, all had 
refused the default option. They fear that outright refusal to pay would make them financial 
lepers for years to come. They want to remain in the world trading system and above all, 
they want to maintain access to fresh funds. 
Between debt bondage and default, is there a third way? Yes, if imaginative management 
were applied- but a just solution to the debt crisis will not happen without plenty of political 
pressure from citizens in North and South. If 'creative reimbursement' or the '3-D solution' 
- standing for Debt, Development, Democracy - were tried, however, debt could become a 
tool for authentic peoples' participation in their own development. 
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The '3-D solution'. Public debt (owed to governments, the World Bank or the IMF) could 
be paid back in local currency, not in hard-earned dollars, and placed in a national 
development fund, with certain conditions. It would be managed not just by the State but 
also by democratically chosen popular representatives of the civil society (with special 
provisions made for fair representation of women, rural people and ethnic minorities). These 
funds could finance development projects proposed by local NGOs and associations, feed 
revolving credit pools in which small fanners and particularly women could get credit at 
normal and non-usurious rates (sometimes called 'peoples' banking', of which the Grameen 
Bank of Bangladesh is a well-known example) and provide salaries for ecological preser-
vation and renewal. 
Countries might also elect to reimburse part of the debt in kind, on the principle that their 
natural heritage is presently being destroyed. Governments would be rewarded for preserv-
ing their forests and soils. Each project could be assigned a monetary value and the debt 
would be written off by that amount as it was completed. For example, the creditor country 
could offer to write down the debt by a set amount for every million trees planted; similarly, 
a monetary value could be placed on the provision of small irrigation works on a given 
number of hectares. Other examples could include collection and conservation of plant and 
animal genetic species, anti-erosion and water conservation measures, planting of 'green 
belts', improvement of building techniques with local materials, etc. This would contribute 
to preserving the common heritage of the planet, which has become an increasingly central 
element of the political agendas of the countries of the North. 
Governments could limit their debt payments to a certain percentage of export earnings (as 
President Alan Garcia of Peru attempted to do) or refuse to pay in today' s commodity dollars. 
For example, copper sold for twice as much a decade ago as in 1987. A copper producer 
should sell only as many tonnes of copper as would have been necessary in, say, 1979 to 
pay back each $1 million worth of debt incurred in 1979. Debtors could also go on an 
interest-paying strike until banks returned some of the flight capital that debtor country 
citizens have illegally stashed away. All these tactics, and others which could be imagined, 
would be far more feasible if Southern countries united around a common program. To date, 
they have remained divided and have submitted to the 'case-by-case' strategy employed by 
their creditors. 
Mutual interest. We in the North have a commercial interest in encouraging creative 
reimbursement and '3-D' solutions. Only healthier economies in the Third World can reduce 
unemployment and keep our own economies humming. For example, Third World debtor 
countries cannot afford to buy Australian exports, thereby contributing to Australian 
employment, if they have no money left over after paying their debts. 
'3-D' solutions would also help to save our environment, as debt is the driving force towards 
environmental destruction. 
Finally, we have a political interest. If we encourage decentralised, democratic, sustainable 
development, our world becomes safer. If, on the other hand, we allow the debt crisis to 
fester and despair to grow, we must expect a much higher level of social conflict and 
terrorism, over-spilling inevitably into creditor societies. 
All of us are passengers on the Titanic, though some of us are travelling first class. 
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Network Briefing Papers provide a forum for 
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development-related issues. They are concise 
(normally 2,000 to 5,000 words) and accessible 
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assistance policy. The views expressed are those 
of the authors. 
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